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STATEMENT OF NATURE OP PROCEEDING 
Respondent agrees with defendant's statement of the 
Nature of the Case as far as it goes, but defendant failed to 
include that the issue of remedy is one of law not fact and the 
writ of Error coram nobis is an improper basis to correct the 
alleged wrong claimed by the defendant/ since this special writ 
is to correct a mistake of fact, usually when a material fact was 
unknown or when the fact could not have been ascertained with 
reasonable diligence. It is not intended to provide review by 
appeal where the complaining party has not sought to appeal, or 
the time for appeal has expired, or a prior appeal has been 
abandoned* Defendant's case further ignores the issue that no 
one can waive the duty of support of a natural parent for a child 
except in the case of adoption of said child or termination of 
parental rights or duties in appropriate cas^s. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District court has continuing 
jurisdiction sufficient to modify a divorce dtecree and order 
support of a natural father for a child when there has been a 
change of circumstances, not apparently contemplated by the 
parties or the court, and state welfare has provided said 
support* 
2. Whether the defendant can raise an issue of law, 
the question of a modification of a divorce decree, by an 
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extraordinary writ of error coram nobisf when the time for appeal 
has passed and further, when an earlier appeal on the merits was 
dismissed by defendant. 
3. Whether the District court should have granted a 
writ of error coram nobis, (assuming arguendo that this writ was 
proper) as requested by defendant below, when in fact tne 
defendant on the merits of his case as to a motion to modify the 
decree of divorce and subsequent legal proceedings could have: 
a. Filed a special appearance to contest jurisdiction 
of the District court to act. 
b. Directly contested the subsequent garnishment 
proceedings, or additionally attacked the court's jurisdiction. 
c. Maintained the early appeal from the District court 
action rather tnan dismissing the same (T120). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The State of Utah on January 14, 1985, and the 
defendant appearing through counsel, argued against a motion of 
the State of Utah to set aside an earlier order of the District 
Court entered July 26, 1984. 
2. The July 26, 1984 order from Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick was a reversal of a previous order entered by the 
Commissioner Sandra Peuler on May 9, 1984, denying the 
defendant's motion to set aside and vacate a prior support order 
modifying a divorce decree of May 7, 1974, and ordering the 
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defendant to pay One Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($150.00) 
per month support. 
3. In November/ 1981, the defendant brought a motion 
to set aside the 1978 orderf which motion was denied. The 
defendant appealed that order, but subsequently dismissed his own 
appeal (T120). 
4. The defendant subsequently stipulated with the 
Office of Recovery Services to pay support and entered a 
voluntary wage assignment to make these payments in 1982. 
5. Commissioner Sandra Peuler denied the defendant's 
February 27, 1984 motion to set aside the prior support order of 
August 23, 1978. 
6. On or about April 23, 1984, defendant's motion for 
I 
a writ of error was argued before Commissioner Sandra Peuler by 
counsel. 
7. On or about Hay 9, 1984, Commissioner Peuler 
entered her recommendation that defendant's motion should be 
denied. The recommendation also stated that counsel should 
advise if a special setting was necessary. 
8. On or about June 26, 1984, counsel for defendant 
appeared ex parte before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and 
obtained an order rejecting Commission Peuler's recommendation 
and granting defendant's motion setting aside the support order 
of August 23, 1978, previously entered. 
9. The ex parte hearing held before the court on June 
26, 1984, was alleged by plaintiff to be in etror as defendant 
failed to serve proper notice upon the plaintiff. 
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10. The State of Utah, Department of Social Services, 
was joined as a party in this particular action since June, 1978 
and at all times had been represented by the Salt Lake County 
Attorney1s office, and said County Attorney's office received no 
notice as set forth above. 
11. Plaintiffs alleged defendant's present counsel 
failed to comply with Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in 
District Court, in that he failed to serve a copy of the proposea 
order on opposing counsel before presenting it to the District 
Court Judge Frederick for signature. 
12. Plaintiff's counsel, thereafter argued that 
defendant's motion for writ of error should be barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata, because in November, 1981, the 
defendant brought a similar motion to set aside the 197 8 support 
order which motion was denied. Defendant's counsel appealed the 
197 8 order, but subsequently dismissed the appeal in the Supreme 
Court, as aforesaid. 
13. Plaintiff's counsel, the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's office, had no actual notice of the order of Judge 
Frederick entered July 26, 1984 reversing the finding and order 
of Commissioner Peuler until December 12, 1984. 
14. This motion of the plaintiff's referred to in 
paragraph 1, was set for hearing before Judge Frederick and after 
due consideration, the court vacated the previous order of July 
26, 1984, denied defendant's Motion for Writ of Error and For 
Reimbursement of Funds, and affirmed the recommendations of 
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Commissioner Peuler made May 9, 1984, This was the order entered 
March lf 1985 (T185) by Judge Frederickr frpm which this appeal 
is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District court's order of March/ 1985 denying 
defendant's Motion for a Writ of Error; denying defendant's 
request for reimbursement and affirming Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendations of May 9f 1984 should be affirmed by this court 
for tne following reasons: 
1. The District court has continuing jurisdiction over 
domestic relation casesf and can modify decrees of divorce as may 
be required. 
2. Plaintiff served defendant by mail with its order 
to show cause why the decree snould not be modified and defendant 
admits that he had actually received process. Actual notice of 
the modification of Civil No. D13163 was sent August 22/ 1978 to 
defendant at Box 41, Nettie/ West Virginia/ and no appeal was 
taicen/ no special appearance to contest jurisdiction was taken by 
defendant. 
3. The District court's denial of defendant's Motion 
to Vacate the Modification of the Divorce Decree in 1981 was 
appealed but the defendant dismissed the appeal. 
4. This action/ an appeal from a TJiird District 
Court's denial of a "Motion For Writ of Error and for 
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Reimbursement of Funds Paid Welfare Department" is an action to 
remedy matters that could have been cured earlier at a previous 
time when the merits of the case were before the District court. 
The issue now is not one of facts, not appearing on the 
face of the record or unknown to the court or to the parties, 
such that being known, would have prevented trie rendition and 
entry of an order, therefore this is not a correct matter for a 
writ of error coram nobis, and the appeal should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
A WRIT OF ERROR CORAH NOBIS IS THE IMPROPER 
REMEDY FOR DEFENDANT AND THE APPEAL BASED 
THEREON SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
1. It is improper for defendant to bring this appeal 
based on a denial of the District court to grant a writ of error 
"coram nobis" to correct what is claimed an invalid modification 
of the divorce decree as to support. 
2. The case of Nevada Welfare Division v. Vine, 1983 
Nevada, 662 P.2d 295, U.S. Sup. Ct. 83, certiorari denied 11-7-83 
1T16 8) does not apply to this appeal because it is the wrong 
procedure. If this action were the previous appeal on the issue 
of modification, or on a special appearance to attack the 
jurisdiction of the lower court to modify a previous divorce 
decree then perhaps the Vine case could be considered. However, 
the issue before the court is one of law, not fact, and is not 
correctable through the use of a writ "coram nobis" at this 
juncture. There is a difference between a writ of error and a 
writ of error coram nobis. 
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"A writ of error is distinguishable for a writ of error 
coram nobis* . . in that the purpose of the former is 
to remove the record to a superior court for review of 
errors of law appearing on the face thereof. . . while 
the principle office of the latter is to enable the 
court rendering judgment to reconsider it, and grant 
relief from errors of fact not appearing on the face of 
the record when the same is still before such court. 4 
CJS 76 § 9 Appeal and Error Note 91. 
"The writ lies for the purpose of obtaining a review of 
a judgment by the same court which rendered it with 
respect to some error of fact affecting the validity or 
regularity of the judgment. The writ is used to obtain 
a review by the court of its own judgment as 
distinguished from a review by an appellate court. The 
writ lies to review a judgment for error of fact as 
distinguished from error of law. It does not lie for 
defenses available at the trial. It lies for error of 
fact not appearing on the face of the record, which 
fact was unknown to the court, and which if it had been 
known would have prevented the rendition and entry of 
the judgment. . . the writ lies not for some unknown 
fact going to the merits of the cage but for some 
unknown fact going to right of the court to proceed and 
which defeats the power of the court to attain a valid 
result in the proceeding. 4 CJS 8^, Mathis v. U.S., DC 
NC, 246 F.Sup. 116. 
Thomas v. State, 190 So.2d 542 is a criminal case where 
defendant was convicted in 1959 of carnal knowledge of a girl 
under twelve years of age, and sentenced to prison for twenty-
five years. 
Defendant filed a writ of error cor&m nobis claiming 
error for failure of defendant to have proper counsel at nunc pro 
tunc proceedings and also claiming irregularities in service of a 
copy of an indictment on defendant. The court held: 
As stated in Horsley v. State, 42 Ala.App. 567, 172 
So.2d 56: 
"Coram nobis is not a plenipotentiary mission to retry 
indictments: it is a carefully guarded engine to root 
out egregious fraud or collusion leading to a judgment. 
Willis v. State, 42 Ala.App.85, 152 So.2d 883; Duncan 
v. State, 42 Ala.App. 111,154 So.2d 302." 
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Nor is the writ of error coram nobis intended to 
provide a review by appeal where the complaining party 
has not sought to appeal and the time for appeal has 
long since expired, Thomas v. State, 274 Ala. 531, 150 
So.2d 387, supra. 
The omission in the original judgment of a showing that 
Thomas had not been served with the indictment, and of 
a showing of allocutus, now complained of in tne 
present petition, could have been reviewed, and if 
erroneous, corrected on appeal. 
Regardless of the correction of the judgment in the 
nunc pro tunc proceedings, the points now raised by 
Thomas could not have benefited him on an appeal of the 
original judgment. 
There was no fraud in the original trial, nor any 
collusive act unknown to the defendant Thomas in his 
original trial perpetrated on him by the state, nor any 
overt matter which would have prevented trie entry of 
the original judgment. See Willis v. State, 42 
Ala.App. 85, 152 So.2d 883. 
It follows that the matters sought to be raised by 
Thomas in this most recent coram nobis proceedings were 
not of a nature to be within the scope of such 
proceedings. Tfte lower court therefore correctly 
dismissed the petition. 
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT RAISE AN ISSUE OF LAW, 
THE QUESTION OF A MODIFICATION OF A DIVORCE 
DECREE, BY AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF ERROR 
CORAM NOBIS, WHEN THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS 
PASSED AND FURTHER, WHEN AN EARLIER APPEAL 
ON THE MERITS WAS DISMISSED BY DEFENDANT. 
3. In this case defendant merely alleges efforts to 
obtain counsel, to appeal and to attack an alleged improper 
judgment and garnishment, but he fails to document times and 
circumstances specifically to justify a cnange of the judgment 
and states no undiscovered or unknown fact that should justify a 
vacating of the previous order of support modification. 
People v. Gennaitte, 274 P.2d 169 127 C.A. 2d 544 
states: 
10 
"It is essential that applicant fdr relief in the 
nature of a writ of error coram nobis state in his 
motion both the probative facts on which his claims 
restf and the time and circumstances under which such 
facts were discovered/ so that court can determine 
whether he has exercised due diligence; and the mere 
allegation of ultimate facts or legal conclusion of 
diligence is insufficient." 
4. The record is wholely absent of any factual data as 
to why the 1981 appeal was dismissed by defendant or what 
material fact is now known that was not known before, and this 
further demonstrates the inappropriateness of the use of writ of 
error coram nobis. Townsend v. Boatmens National Bank, Mo. App. 
148 S.W.2d 87. 
5. Coram nobis is a review by the same court to 
correct its own judgment for errors of fact, not law, as 
distinguished from a review by an appellet court. Pryor v. 
Woodall Industries, Inc., 167 So.2d 920, 922, 250 Miss. 672. 
6. This appeal should not be allowed for defendant to 
attempt cure of a procedural or jurisdictional error which was 
subject of remedy in a proceeding prior in time to this appeal. 
People v. Tuthill 198 P.2d 505, 506, 32 Cal.2d 819. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS CONTINUING JURISDICTION 
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY A DIVORCE DECREE AND ORDER 
SUPPORT OF A NATURAL FATHER FOR A CHILD WHEN 
THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
STATE WELFARE HAS PROVIDED SAID SUPPORT. 
7. In section 78 45-1 to 9.2 U.C.A. 1953 as amended, 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act requires natural parents 
to support their children. A child1s right to support is his own 
right not his parentfs. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895. 
This court has further held that a father had to pay child 
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support after the child reached twenty-one (21) years of age 
where the child was retarded and incapable of self-support. 
Garrard v. Garrard 1980f 570 P.2d 422. 
Title 78-45b-l through 22 U.C.A. 1953 as aunended, 
Public Support of Children Actf empowers the plaintiff to seek 
reimbursement from people like the defendant, when the 
responsibility of child support is thrown on the State and the 
welfare division is obligated to seek reimbursement. The 
stipulation at the time of divorce states the defendant ma^ . 
(emphasis ours) be required to give up his rights to the yet 
unborn child and may require plaintiff to waive rignts to child 
support. Here, there was no adoption as contemplated and support 
burden fell to the state. This was a change of circumstances and 
the defendant was notified of the state's order to show cause in 
June, 1978 and the notice of a hearing on August 16, 1978. His 
failure to respond adequately to protect what ne now perceives 
his rights or privileges, is not adequate to sustain this appeal 
and the same should be dismissed. 
8. In paragraph #18 of defendant's motion of February 
27, 1984, counsel makes mention of a hearing in the original 
divorce action, however, the record clearly shows (attachments a, 
b, c, d to appellants brief) the work of Attorney Reagan was a 
Stipulation and default divorce and the only hearing was a brief 
one before Judge Marcellus Snow based on a stipulation of 
parties. This is factually different than the Vine case. We 
think it is proper to note that the child was not represented and 
it proper to ask who can waive a child's right to support. In 
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addition, it might be observed that at the time of the hearing of 
the divorce action, no one raised the question of who should 
support the child if there were no adoption, nor did anyone raise 
the question as to whether the child's right to future support 
could be waived, and if so, by whom and under what circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter came before the District court (T135) on a 
Motion to Vacate an Order of Support due to child support paid by 
the Utah Department of Social Services subsequent to a divorce 
decree which declared that defendant had no duty to pay support. 
The order of 1981 denying defendant's relief was appealed and the 
appeal was subsequently dismissed by the defendant. On 
defendant's ex parte motion at a subsequent court hearing, the 
recommendations of the court commissioner were reversed, claiming 
the support order was in error. Pursuant t^ Rule 60b(5)(7) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the State of Utah, Department of Social 
Services through the County Attorney's offiqe, moved to vacate 
the order entered by the court on July 26, 2J984, which order 
reversed the findings of the Commissioner. After a hearing on 
the motion, an order to vacate the July 26, 1984 order was 
entered by Judge J. Dennis Frederick on Mardh 1, 1985. 
Defendants lodged this appeal based on the court's refusal to 
grant an order vacating of the 197 8 support order on a theory 
that a writ of error coram nobis was appropriate. 
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Plaintiff requests a dismissal of this appeal as the 
writ of error coram nobis is an improper procedural vehicle to 
correct what defendant perceives as his rights. Defendant has a 
continuing obligation to support his natural offspring and it is 
the child's right, not the parents, to be supported and said 
support may be ordered based on the change of circumstances as 
here occurred after the child was born, subsequent to the 
divorce, and where said support was provided by the state agency 
in absence of the defendant. Defendant has wholely failed to 
show any facts, hidden or not discoverable prior to this appeal 
that would justify the court in granting the defendants1 motions. 
All recommendations of the commissioner and final orders of the 
District court are based on proper procedure and law and 
plaintiff cannot here be granted any relief on appeal. 
Defendants1 problem arises from his failure to contest the 197 8 
motion and order to show cause, to properly proceed relative to 
his appeal of 1981, his voluntary wage assignment of 1982 and 
support payments thereunder. There is no impropriety in 
procedure or fact by the plaintiff herein, accordingly, plaintiff 
respectfully requests this appeal be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
2RNARD M. V£AN1 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 533-5261 
14 
I hereby certify that I mailed foiir true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent to: 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
DATED this day of 
15 
